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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-1137 
 ___________ 
 
 OCTAVIO LUIS RAMIREZ, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A029-589-447) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Jeffrey L. Romig 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 3, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: February 10, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Octavio Ramirez petitions for review of the December 28, 2009 
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to dismiss his appeal and affirm 
the Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for deferral of removal under the 
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Convention Against Torture.  The Government has moved to dismiss the petition for lack 
of jurisdiction.  For the reasons that follow, we will grant in part and deny in part the 
Government’s motion to dismiss.  To the extent that we have jurisdiction, we will deny 
Ramirez’s petition for review.   
I. 
Ramirez, a native of Nicaragua, was admitted to the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States in 2000.  In 2002, Ramirez pleaded guilty in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida of conspiracy to import 
five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963.1
Ramirez, proceeding pro se, conceded removability and filed an application for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and for deferral of removal under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).
  Based on his 
conviction, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings 
against Ramirez pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (conviction of an aggravated 
felony) and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (conviction of a controlled substance violation).   
2
                                                 
1 Ramirez was convicted and sentenced to 135 months of imprisonment and is 
currently in federal custody serving that sentence.   
2 Venue was changed from Florida to Pennsylvania in January 2008 and removal 
proceedings were completed in York, Pennsylvania.   
  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) held that because Ramirez had 
been convicted of a felony relating to a drug trafficking crime, he was not eligible for 
asylum under INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i).  The IJ further held that because the conviction 
involved more than a five-year sentence, the conviction was a “particularly serious 
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crime” which rendered him ineligible for withholding of removal under INA § 
241(b)(3)(B)(ii).  The IJ denied relief with respect to Ramirez’s remaining request for 
deferral of deportation under CAT because he concluded Ramirez had not met his burden 
of proof.   
Ramirez’s claim under the CAT is based primarily on his testimony and that of his 
former attorney that he provided information to a prosecutor for the government of 
Nicaragua concerning Arnoldo Aleman, the former president of Nicaragua.  Aleman was 
convicted of money laundering and corruption and sentenced to a 20-year term of 
imprisonment beginning in December 2003.  The sentence was commuted in 2005 due to 
Aleman’s poor health.  Ramirez believes that Aleman, or persons associated with him, 
will seek vengeance against Ramirez if he returns to Nicaragua.  In denying his CAT 
claim, the IJ found that Ramirez established a subjectively genuine fear of returning to 
Nicaragua based on his having served as an informant against the former President, but 
had failed to show a “clear probability” of torture in the event of his return to Nicaragua.   
Ramirez appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  The BIA conducted a de novo 
review of the IJ’s application of law to the facts, and affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that 
Ramirez failed to establish that he would more likely than not face torture by, or with the 
acquiescence of, a member of the government of Nicaragua.  Ramirez then filed the 
instant petition for review.  The Government filed a motion to dismiss the petition for 
lack of jurisdiction.     
II. 
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 Although we generally lack jurisdiction to review final orders of removal against 
aliens who, like Ramirez, are removable for having committed an aggravated felony, see 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), we nonetheless have jurisdiction to review “pure 
questions of law” and “issues of application of law to fact, where the facts are undisputed 
and not the subject of challenge.”  Kamara v. Att'y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  We review 
such questions of law de novo.  Kamara, 420 F.3d at 211.   
The Government argues that dismissal is warranted here because Ramirez does not 
raise any legal questions.  We disagree.  His petition alleges that the IJ erred as a matter 
of law in relying on In re J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 917-18 (AG 2006), to deny his 
claim under the CAT.  He also argues that the IJ and the BIA misapplied the CAT 
standard to the undisputed facts of this case.3
An alien seeking relief under the CAT must demonstrate that it is “more likely 
than not” that he will be tortured in the event of return to a designated country.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(c)(2).  The applicant must show that the torture will be inflicted “by or at the 
   
III. 
                                                 
3 Ramirez claims that the IJ improperly failed to consider whether the Nicaraguan 
government would acquiesce to his torture, and that the United States government 
breached its agreement to protect him as a witness.  Because Ramirez’s CAT 
claim was denied on other grounds, these arguments were not reached by the 
agency and need not be addressed here.  Furthermore, to the extent that these are 
claims “that an Immigration Judge or the BIA incorrectly weighed evidence, failed 
to consider evidence or improperly weighed equitable factors,” they are not 
questions of law that we have jurisdiction to review under § 1252(a)(2)(D).  
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instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.”  8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.18(a)(1), (7); see also Silva-Rengifo v. 
Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 70 (3d Cir. 2007).  In assessing whether the applicant has met 
this burden of proof, the agency must consider all evidence relevant to the possibility of 
future torture.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).   
Ramirez argues that the IJ erred as a matter of law by placing too much emphasis 
on the decision of In re J-F-F-, in which the Attorney General stated that a petitioner may 
not establish a claim for CAT relief merely by stringing together a series of suppositions 
to show that it is more likely than not that torture will result where the evidence does not 
establish that each step in the hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not to 
occur.  23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 917-18 (AG 2006).  We disagree.  See, e.g., Savchuck v. 
Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2008).  The IJ committed no legal error in 
analyzing Ramirez’s CAT claim as a series of hypothetical events (e.g., that Aleman will 
seek vengeance against him based on his cooperation, and that the Nicaraguan 
government would acquiesce in this).4
                                                                                                                                                             
Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).   
4 We note that Ramirez argued before the IJ that certain segments of Nicaraguan 
society already knew that he had offered information to be used against Aleman.  In 
support of this contention, Ramirez offered evidence that a Nicaraguan journalist had 
earlier attempted to communicate with him to ask about the same.  Thus, the 
allegation that his cooperation was already known to at least some Nicaraguans is not 
properly characterized as a hypothetical or contingent event.  However, the IJ’s 
approach concerning the remainder of Ramirez’s claim – that Aleman or his 
supporters are likely to kill him because of this cooperation, and that the Nicaraguan 
government would acquiesce – was correct. 
  The IJ evaluated each of Ramirez’s suppositions 
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and concluded that he had not established that it is well known within Nicaragua that his 
cooperation led to Aleman’s conviction, or that anyone in Nicaragua will seek to torture 
him when he returns because of his cooperation; thus, he had not demonstrated a “clear 
probability” of torture in Nicaragua.5
                                                 
5 The “clear probability standard” is equivalent to the “more likely than not 
standard.”  See Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 349 (3d Cir. 2008).       
   
Further, the BIA applied the correct legal standard in its opinion dismissing 
Ramirez’s appeal.  The BIA properly reviewed the IJ’s factual findings for clear error and 
conducted a de novo review of the IJ’s application of law to the facts.  The BIA 
determined that Ramirez failed to establish that he would “more likely than not” face 
torture by or with the acquiescence of a member of the Nicaraguan government.  The 
BIA’s conclusion was based on the IJ’s factual findings that (1) Ramirez’s cooperation 
with authorities occurred in 2004, after Aleman’s conviction in Nicaragua in 2003; (2) 
there was insufficient evidence to establish that Ramirez’s cooperation had been made 
public in Nicaragua; (3) there was no evidence that the Nicaraguan prosecutor used any 
of the evidence provided by Ramirez in the prosecution of former President Aleman; (4) 
there was no evidence that Ramirez had received threats from former President Aleman 
or his associates; and (5) there was no indication that Aleman or anyone else would have 
any interest in torturing him following his return.  Having reviewed the record, we are 
confident that the BIA considered all of the evidence and properly applied the CAT 
standard.   
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IV. 
We agree with the Government that we lack jurisdiction over the remainder of 
Ramirez’s petition.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  Accordingly, we deny the petition to the 
extent it argues that the IJ or the BIA misapplied the relevant legal standard to Ramirez’s 
CAT claim, and dismiss the remainder of the petition.  
